The causes of Japan's financial crisis by Patrick, Hugh & Ito, Takatoshi
The Causes of Japan’s Financial Crisis
Hugh Patrick
Columbia University
1
1.2
Pacific Economic Papers
1.3
No. 288 February 1999
CONTENTS
Introduction ...................................................................................................1.5
Basic causes of current banking difficulties..............................................1.8
Concluding comments ...............................................................................1.16
Notes ..............................................................................................................1.17
References.......................................................................................................1.17

TH E CAUSES O F Japan’s FINANCIAL CRISIS
Abstract to come
Introduction
A mere decade ago Japan’s financial system, and especially its banking system, was not only
the largest but the strongest in the world. Nine of the world’s top ten banks in asset size were
Japanese; the Big Four Japanese securities companies were the world’s largest; and its life
and casualty insurance companies were likewise huge. Banks had ample, low cost, deposit
funds and the highest credit ratings. The largest were expanding their international
operations vigorously, and performed 34 per cent of the world’s international lending
business, more than banks domiciled in any other country.
Today presents a completely different picture. Japan’s financial system is weak and in
disarray. Banks no longer rank among the world’s top ten, and their credit ratings have
declined dramatically. Two of Japan’s top 21 banks have already collapsed, as has one of the
Big Four securities companies, and a mid-sized life insurance company. This is not only
unprecedented in Japan’s postwar history, until the 1990s it was unthinkable.
This paper focuses primarily upon the problems of the Japanese banking industry,
although the analysis applies in many respects to the securities and insurance industries as
well. It does not consider Japan’s fiscal mess: its budget deficits, tax system, government
fiscal and loan programs, or the special account debts that cannot be serviced. This is a
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comprehensive overview rather than a detailed analysis of specific issues or topics. It provides
the groundwork for the conference Financial Reform in Japan and Australia by addressing
two themes: the ‘postwar’ financial system and its implications; and causes of the current
banking difficulties.
The objectives of any financial system in a market-based economy are threefold: the
safety of the system in order to prevent bank runs and monetary panics; its effectiveness in
mobilizing savings and allocating them to productive, efficient uses by financial intermedia-
tion through banks or capital (stock and bond) markets; and efficiency in the provision of
financial services, best achieved in a highly competitive system. These objectives can be in
conflict, depending on how the system is organized and what constitute the rules of the game.
The achievement of these objectives depends on the overall economic environment, including
the level of economic development, the degree of competition, and the extent of global financial
market integration.
In designing the postwar financial system, the regulatory authorities, essentially the
Ministry of Finance, always placed great emphasis on system safety, and maintained or built
upon the wartime bank-based financial system.
The postwar financial system
The basic characteristics of the financial system in the era of rapid growth until the mid-1970s
are well known.1 It was essentially a bank-based system, with deliberately underdeveloped
stock and bond markets. Risk-averse savers had few alternatives to holding savings deposits;
and rapidly growing corporations had to rely heavily on bank loans to finance their
extraordinarily high rates of fixed investment. The structure of banks was stable and classes
of bank were segmented by function and size of customer. Deposit-taking institutions
included city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks, which together comprised the
Big Banks, lending mainly to large corporations; and local or regional banks, mutual savings
banks, and credit associations and cooperatives, lending mainly to medium and small
businesses and individuals.2 The system was also stable in that there was no new entry, and
virtually no failures or other exits; the few failures were of small, badly managed, inconse-
quential institutions which were readily and rapidly absorbed by larger banks.
In effect, the essence of the regulatory regime was to guarantee that banks would not
fail, so their management, stockholders and depositors were protected. This was achieved by
interest rate controls, with wide spreads between deposit and loan rates, so that all financial
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institutions made profits. Moreover, a ‘convoy’ system was maintained whereby the assets of
all banks grew at about the same rate, and their relative ranking did not change over time.
In this system interest rate competition was not allowed and
 
other forms of competition were
muted. Moreover, it was the responsibility of the strong to take care of the weak. Should a
troubled small financial institution have to be merged into a larger one, any losses were more
than offset by the franchise value of the branches thus acquired.
The system was based on close, symbiotic relationships between the powerful Ministry
of Finance and the big banks, securities companies, and insurance companies. These collusive
arrangements were based on the leadership of the Ministry of Finance through administra-
tive guidance, price setting, protection, and restriction of competitive impulses. Accordingly,
it was a system of implicit guarantees against losses for banks and depositors.
The development of the main bank system in many respects epitomized the stereotype
of large bank–big business relationships, though in practice given the industrial structure,
most of the banking system’s credit was lent to medium-sized and smaller businesses. The
main bank system overcame severe problems of inadequate information and difficulties in
analysing the many new projects embodied in the process of rapid postwar economic
development.3 The main bank monitored its main industrial clients, established and
maintained de facto lending syndicates to them, and had a special responsibility to step in and
provide financial and managerial assistance in times of trouble. While all Big Banks had some
main bank clients, the major main banks were Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, Fuji, Sanwa
and Dai-ichi-Kangyo, notably with relationships with their respective keiretsu members, and
the Industrial Bank of Japan, with a wide range of main bank relationships.
This postwar system was very safe and it carried out its financial intermediation role
well, but it was not very efficient. Savers bore most of the costs because of low interest rates
on their deposits and lack of alternative financial instruments. They correctly perceived,
however, that their savings were fueling the process of rapid growth, and their reward was
in wage increases, not interest yields on savings.
The postwar system could not last forever. As companies and banks thrived and grew
much larger, they became stronger and more independent and many chafed under the
restrictions of the system. The most important cause of the demise of the system however,
occurred in the mid-1970s, when Japanese growth slowed and Japan shifted from being an
economy in which private investment demand outstripped private saving to one in which ex
ante private saving became greater than ex ante private investment.
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This shift is fundamental in understanding the performance and macroeconomic
policies of the last 20 plus years. Japan has been and is a demand-deficient economy, in which
private saving continues to be larger than private investment demand. This change has
dramatically affected the financial system and especially the banking system, and fundamen-
tally undermined the highly regulated and controlled stable postwar financial system. The
supply of funds suddenly become ample, interest rates declined, and pressures for a system
of market-based interest rates became irresistible.
Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance came under increasing pressure to deregulate the
financial system: to allow market-determined interest-rates, the creation of new financial
instruments, development of a vigorous, competitive bond market, the breaking down of
market segregation, and in general increased competition for all financial institutions and in
all financial markets. However, the deregulation process has been steady but very gradual,
beginning in the late 1970s and still continuing. A great deal of progress had been made by
the early 1990s, and currently the ‘Big Bang’ of comprehensive financial reform, announced
in late 1996 and due to result in completely ‘free, fair, and open’ financial markets by March
2001, is supposed to bring about the final stage of deregulation. While there are likely to
remain a few unresolved issues, notably the postal savings system, for the most part this final
deregulation process is proceeding on schedule.
In other words, Japan has been moving to a competitive, market-based system of
banking and capital markets. Financial institutions are now under great pressure to cut costs,
increase efficiency, and develop new financial products in order to compete. The new
environment creates new kinds of risks, with new opportunities and dangers to taking risk,
including interest rate risk for assets and liabilities, exchange rate risk, and credit risk since
companies are also in a more competitive environment.
The ways in which the Ministry of Finance has handled, or mishandled, this long-run
deregulation process and the concomitant changes in financial markets laid the groundwork
for the current banking and financial mess.
Basic causes of current banking difficulties
Japan’s current banking difficulties, which indeed have persisted since the early 1990s,
developed over a considerable period of time, with a number of forces at work. Four causes
were particularly important. They were failure to create a prudential regulatory system, the
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creation and then bursting of the stock and real estate market bubbles, globalisation, and the
high rate of financial innovation.
Before considering the causes, however, it is important to define the nature and extent
of the problem. While Japanese banks have a number of problems, the fundamental problem
is that the banking system has a huge amount of actual and potential non-performing (i.e. bad)
loans relative to its capitalisation and bad loan reserves. Moreover, this problem has festered
and worsened throughout the 1990s. The harsh reality is that every Big Bank and indeed most
other deposit-taking institutions have had serious bad loan difficulties. These range from
loans to companies that have gone bankrupt; non-performing loans in which interest and
principal payments are unpaid and substantially past due; loans which have been restruc-
tured at highly preferential, extraordinarily low interest rates; and loans which are currently
being serviced but future payments are in doubt. Banks lending in urban areas, particularly
Tokyo and Osaka, have been the most hard hit. In contrast regional banks in rural areas to
which the real estate speculative mania did not spread have had minor losses, and are now
the strongest banks in Japan.
Over time the disclosed amounts of bad loans have increased until recently, even after
write-offs. Private estimates of actual bad loans have been substantially greater than the
amounts announced by the banks and the Ministry of Finance.4 In Autumn 1997 the Ministry
of Finance shocked the world with its estimate of the bad and troubled loan problem – some
¥76.7 trillion, triple previous estimates, and 12 per cent of total bank loans and credits, 12
per cent of loans of Big Banks, ten per cent of regional banks, and 14 per cent of second-tier
banks. However, this reflected the new inclusion in the definition of bad loans a category of
loans currently being serviced but in potential future danger. A Bank of Japan study
estimated that over a three year period about 84 per cent of such loans continued to be
serviced, but of course future estimates depend upon corporate borrower performance, in turn
dependent upon the overall performance of the economy.
In practice, the actual amount of bank bad loans has been ambiguous, for a combination
of definitional, measurement, and disclosure reasons. Most data are on a parent bank basis,
but when their various real estate financing and other non-bank financed institutions are
included on a consolidated basis, the estimates are often far different. Only in 1997 did
regional banks and credit associations first disclose their bad loans. Over time the definition
of bad loans has become more comprehensive and clear, now approaching the US SEC
definition. However, each bank estimates its own bad loan situation. The presumption is that
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the estimates of stronger banks are closer to reality than those of weaker banks. When weak
banks have in fact collapsed, subsequent audits have revealed that the actual bad loan
situation was far worse than the banks had announced even a short time earlier.
Three facts are important. First, most loans – good, doubtful, and bad – have some form
of collateral backing them, frequently real estate. The key issue is the disposal value of the
collateral. The actual losses banks have taken and will take are substantially less than the
estimates of bank bad loans bandied about. Second, it has been very difficult for tax and legal
reasons for a bank to actually write off a loan as bad. Most of the ‘write-offs’ are in the form
of provisioning – increased allocations of profits and capital to bank loan loss reserves. Third,
while small until 1995, over time the cumulative amount of actual write-offs has been huge
and impressive. The 21 Big Banks between 1992 and 1998 wrote off ¥42.02 trillion, most (68.5
per cent) in the last three years and ¥12.14 trillion (28.9 per cent) in the last year alone.5 This
was financed from operations profits, realised capital gains on securities holdings, and
modest capital account transfers. The immensity of this write-off is apparent in comparison
with the amount of capital these banks had at their peak (March 1994) of ¥22.15 trillion.
Bad loans and their write-offs are directly related to a bank’s capital. Banks engaging
in international operations, with overseas subsidiaries and branches, have been subject to the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 8 per cent capital adequacy requirement, a serious
constraint during much of the 1990s. As capital was used to write off bad loans, banks had
to raise more capital (difficult and expensive); reduce total assets; or shift their asset portfolio
risk mix away from loans to government bonds. Banks doing only domestic business – credit
associations and cooperatives, second-tier regional banks, and some of the first-tier regional
banks – are subject to only a 4 per cent capital requirement. In reality, both the 8 per cent and
4 per cent requirements are unusually low in international comparison; bank capital
adequacy remains an issue for the future.
Failure to create prudential regulatory system
The first cause of the banking crisis was the fact that deregulation took place without the
creation of an effective system of prudential regulation and supervision to replace the postwar
system of regulated interest rates, convoys, and constrained competition which provided
safety to the system. Deregulation generates competition. Banks lost their guaranteed
profits, market niches, and the franchise value of deposit-collecting branches. Banks had to
adjust to the challenges as well as opportunities of an increasingly risky environment, yet
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their capital bases were small. This created a situation of moral hazard, in which banks took
on greater risk in the expectation that if they suffered losses the Ministry of Finance would
bail them out. This was particularly true of the Big Banks, assumed to be too large to be
allowed to fail.
Since the deregulatory process was gradual, it took a long time for the Ministry of
Finance to realise it simply could not, and more importantly, should not guarantee all banks
against failure.6 In the mid-1990s the Ministry of Finance realised that even depositors might
no longer feel completely safe. While deposits were insured up to ¥10 million by the Deposit
Insurance Corporation (DIC), the insurance fees charged to banks were very low and the DIC
reserves minuscule. They could be, and in fact were, soon depleted by several small banking
institution failures.
To guarantee basic system safety the Ministry of Finance and government have taken
three actions. First, in summer 1995 the Ministry of Finance announced that all deposits
would be guaranteed until March 31, 2001. However, no specific funds were earmarked to
support this pledge. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) believed its announcement effects were
sufficient to ensure credibility. Second, deposit insurance fees were sharply increased, up to
US levels. This generated new DIC income and reserves, but the amounts were sufficient only
to handle two or three small bank failures annually, not more. Third, in February 1998 the
government enacted its ¥30 trillion bank bail-out package, of which ¥17 trillion is to cover the
guarantee on deposits in excess of ¥10 million until 2001. Thus, a credible safety net for
depositors was finally established.
However, MoF has been much slower in imposing disclosure, capital strengthening, and
other prudential regulations. Its supervisory capabilities appeared so weak they were hived
off in June 1998 to the newly established Financial Supervisory Agency directly under the
Cabinet Secretariat. The reluctance of MoF to move more rapidly in the 1990s to impose a
system of prudential regulation was probably because it did not understand fully the
implications of deregulation. After all, deregulation undermined the old convoy system, and
made traditional MoF modes of action now seem counterproductive. MoF persisted nonethe-
less in attempting to defend an inefficient, uncompetitive, and outmoded system.
Bursting bubbles and macroeconomic policy mistakes
The second, and indeed most obvious, cause of the banking mess was first the creation in the
late 1980s and then the bursting of the stock market and real estate bubbles in the early 1990s.
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The basic causes of the bubbles included macro mis-management; widespread belief that,
based on the entire postwar experience, land prices would never decline for any sustained
period so real estate was excellent collateral; bank and related non-bank financial interme-
diaries, with ample, even excess, funds rushing into the financing of urban land and real
estate projects; and, finally, this process creating a high degree of speculative excess in both
real estate and stock markets. Much of this story is familiar, and does not need to be repeated
here.7
However, macroeconomic policy mismanagement deserves special attention, since
Japan’s poor economic performance during the 1990s has made the bank bad loan problem
worse over time, and has made it more difficult to resolve the ongoing banking and financial
mess. Between 1988 and 1998 the Japanese government (i.e. the Ministry of Finance) made
five major macroeconomic policy mistakes. While both fiscal and monetary policy instruments
were involved, the Bank of Japan was subservient to, rather than autonomous from, the
Ministry of Finance.
There were two dimensions to these policy mistakes. One was the size, timing, and
degree of commitment when the authorities undertook demand stimulus or restraint. The
other was the growing imbalance between the use of fiscal policy and monetary policy.
Because the MoF’s fiscal policy since 1980 was single-minded pursuit of budget deficit
reduction and budget surplus creation, the responsibility for compensatory macro policy fell
heavily and excessively on the use of monetary policy instruments.
In 1986 when, following the sharp decline in the price of oil, the yen appreciated more
than expected and economic growth slowed more than desired, the sole policy response was
monetary stimulus. Interest rates were reduced to postwar lows and money supply was
expanded, while the MoF persisted in its efforts to reduce the budget deficits of the 1970s.
That policy succeeded in accelerating economic growth. The problem is that the policy was
continued for too long, at the least fueling and some would argue creating the stock and real
estate bubbles of 1988–90. That was the first macroeconomic mistake. In 1989, the Bank of
Japan finally began to raise interest rates sharply in a series of steps, puncturing the bubbles,
and leading to eventual economic growth slowdown, and then stagnation.
The second mistake was in not easing monetary policy and fiscal policy sooner and more
forcefully in the early 1990s, in 1992–93. The authorities saw the downturn as primarily a
business cycle. They underestimated both the cumulative effect of structural problems, and
the lasting and profound effects of the huge ongoing decline in asset values. The prevailing
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perception was that, as in the past, the downturn would be relatively short-lived and economic
recovery and growth would occur readily.
The third mistake was to rely excessively on easy monetary policy in the mid-1990s, so
that interest rates since 1995 have been at incredibly and undesirably low levels. This
extreme imbalance between fiscal and monetary policy has virtually shackled the latter,
making it very difficult to stimulate demand. While the extraordinarily low interest rates
have helped banks and borrowers, in effect they simply postponed the resolution of the bad
loan and corporate bankruptcy problems, but at high economic and political costs. The low
interest rate policy has generated an excessively weak yen. Savers have been deeply
dissatisfied, and are increasingly seeking higher yields in foreign assets. Returns on pension
funds have been seriously inadequate, so that virtually all pension programs are substantially
underfunded. And, once interest rates do rise to a more normal level, the prices of government
bonds and similar financial assets will drop, imposing huge capital losses on holders.
(Government bonds are probably Japan’s most risky financial asset in the intermediate term.)
The fourth macro policy mistake has been in the way fiscal stimulus through supple-
mentary budgets in the mid-1990s was applied: too little, too late, and most important, too
grudgingly.8 Policy stimulus is supposed to inspire confidence in business people and
consumers. However, each policy package, especially the tax cut component, was presented
as temporary, and incorporated offsetting policies which made ambiguous the stimulative
signal that was supposedly being sent. Moreover, the credibility of each fiscal stimulus
package was undermined both by the exaggerated statements concerning the real amount of
stimulus (the real water, to use the Japanese phrase) and by the focus on public works
construction that has become increasingly unproductive – roads, railroads, bridges to
nowhere. It was not until the supplementary budget in Autumn 1995 that fiscal stimulus
finally became effective, generating a good recovery, with 3.4 per cent GDP growth, in fiscal
1996.
The fifth macroeconomic policy mistake was the government decision in late 1996,
beguiled by excessively optimistic economic forecasts for 1997 and beyond, to shift its top
policy priority 180 degrees from sustaining economy recovery to tackling the long-run,
structural problem of budget deficit reduction. While the concern was appropriate, the timing
was far too early. The policy error had two major components. The first was to shift the 1997
budget to severe fiscal restraint from 1996 budget ease, reducing demand generation by as
much as 2 percentage points of GDP. This was done by increasing the consumption tax from
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3 to 5 per cent, ending the ¥2 trillion temporary personal income tax cut, and raising medical
care and other user fees. The second error was to enact a fiscal structure reform law which
stipulated steady annual decreases in future government budget deficits and in the issuance
of deficit financing government bonds.
Rather than continuing the recovery, in 1997 Japan’s economy stalled and then went
into decline. GDP shrank by 0.7 per cent, and by year end the economy was in recession
(defined as two consecutive quarters of negative growth). The fiscal structure reform law
shackled Prime Minister Hashimoto’s government politically; if he were to admit it was a
mistake his own position was at risk. Accordingly, even as economic conditions were obviously
worsening at the beginning of 1998, his government had first to pass a restrictive 1998 budget
in order to comply with the law before it could – at long last – announce in April 1998 the huge
supplementary budget of ¥16.6 trillion (about ¥12 trillion in real demand-generating
expenditures and tax cuts), and to pass it in June 1998 in an extended Diet session.
The Japanese economy has been the victim of these macroeconomic policy errors
throughout the 1990s. On the one hand the MoF (Banking Bureau) depended upon the
restoration of economic growth to halt and reverse the continuing declines in urban real estate
prices, to convert marginal bank loans into good rather than bad, and otherwise to ease the
handling of the persistent, immense bad loan problem. On the other hand the MoF (Budget
and Tax Bureau) persistently pursued budget deficit reducing measures which thwarted
economic recovery.
Effects of globalisation
The third cause of the ongoing banking mess is what is vaguely denoted by the word
‘globalisation’. This refers to changes both in the world political and economic environment
and in Japan’s now major position in the world economy. From the perspective of Japan’s
financial system several elements are particularly important.
First, since Japan is now a large country – in the terminology of economists – its
economic and financial policies are subject to reactive foreign pressures from the United
States, the European Community, the G-7, and others. Second, Japan has become the world’s
largest creditor nation as its persistent current account surpluses has had to be invested
abroad. Japanese banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions actively
engaged in foreign lending and portfolio investment, thereby exposing themselves to major
foreign exchange risks. As the yen appreciated, the cumulative losses were huge, almost on
1.15
No. 288 February 1999
the same order of magnitude as the financial system’s domestic bad loan losses. Third, the
flourishing of a free global capital market — the Euro-market — provided Japanese large
creditworthy companies with inexpensive bond and equity alternatives to loans from
Japanese banks. The MoF could not stop that offshore financing process. Fourth, continuing
deregulation, particularly the Big Bang, has made it attractive for foreign banks, investment
banks, securities companies, mutual funds, insurance companies and asset management
companies to compete in the Japanese home market, on Japan’s hitherto restricted,
sacrosanct turf.
Financial technology innovation
The fourth cause of the current financial mess is the high rate of innovation in finance. This
now includes a wide range of sophisticated high tech derivatives, complex trading technolo-
gies, and changes in scale and organisation for the efficient management of financial services.
This wave of innovation has been accomplished mainly by US banks, investment banks and
other financial institutions, with some significant European players as well. While highly
sophisticated financial products are primarily for very large financial and industrial
corporations, new technologies are important in retail financial services markets as well,
such as ATMs and the development and marketing of investment trusts (mutual funds).
Japanese banks have been organisationally and institutionally unable to learn, absorb
and implement many of these new technologies sufficiently rapidly to be able to compete in
such markets with foreign institutions. These technologies require specialists, not generalists,
so the traditional Japanese management system of job rotation and seniority-based wages
undermine the development and retention of specialists. The productivity and profitability
of transactions-based wholesale financial markets are directly and quickly measurable, and
excellent specialists are paid extraordinarily well. The most capable Japanese are frequently
hired away by foreign firms applying their systems of performance-based huge bonuses but
without job security.
A few major financial institutions have adjusted to these market realities, at least in
foreign operations, but not most. For example, Nomura Securities Company’s New York
operations were highly profitable in 1996, and its London operations in 1997. Both were run
by non-Japanese, and the top bonuses of the highest performing specialists were more than
US$20 million.
1.16
Pacific Economic Papers
Concluding comments
The discussion in the previous section suggests basic reasons why Japan’s severe banking
problems have persisted so long. Here I recapitulate.
First was the mistaken belief in the early-mid 1990s that the economy would rebound
quickly from what was perceived to be little more than a cyclical downturn, and again the
mistaken belief in late 1996 that recovery was so firmly entrenched that the fiscal priority
could immediately return to budget deficit reduction. If the economy and especially real estate
prices had indeed turned up, then adjustment would have been easier and perhaps less costly,
so a policy of waiting it out was attractive, but turned out to be mistaken. Not surprisingly
this led to a series of macroeconomic policy mistakes: too little stimulus, too great a reliance
on monetary relative to fiscal stimulus.
Second, as a consequence, MoF initially decided and the banks readily agreed to simply
wait out the bad loan problems until economic growth was restored. It was not until 1995 that
banks seriously started disclosing and writing off bad loans. And it was not until recently that
they reduced dividend rates, halted annual increases in wages and bonus, or began to reduce
the number of employees significantly despite earlier attrition opportunities. In a remarkable
statement in 1995, Nikkeiren (The Federation of Employers Associations) acidly noted that
bank manager salaries were 24 per cent higher than those in comparable positions in
industry, and urged that banks reduce the disparity before taxpayers monies (government
funds) be used to bail them out of their difficulties. The widespread sense among the public
that banks were not making any significant sacrifices has made it difficult for the political
leadership to commit government funds to handle what came to be an increasingly obvious
need to bail out the banks if the system were not to fall into chaos.
Third, the economy continued to grow only very slowly, averaging about 1 per cent
annually since 1991; more ordinary loans became doubtful, and more doubtful loans became
bad. Businesses could not generate cash flows for interest payments much less loan
repayments. Moreover, urban commercial real estate prices continued to decline, are now
some 70 per cent or so below their peak, and may only in mid-1998 be reaching the bottom.
Office space, very tight in 1990, became super abundant by 1995, as projects were completed.
Rents declined precipitously, exacerbated by the custom that most leases are for a maximum
of only two years. Many speculative projects, such as golf courses, have been only partially
constructed and may never be completed. Nonetheless, banks and other holders of real estate,
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directly or as collateral, have refrained from selling, apparently in hopes the market would
bottom out soon as well as the fear that if they sell real estate prices will fall even further.
This series of mis-estimations of Japanese economic performance, which delayed and
thereby worsened Japan’s financial crisis, have created the current crisis in Japanese
financial institutions and markets. Only since early 1998 has the government begun to
seriously address these needs for financial reform and begun to provide the public funding
that is essential.
Notes
1 Standard references on the postwar period include Suzuki (1985 and 1987), Feldman
(1986), Cargill and Royama (1988), Rosenbluth (1989), FAIR (1991), and Cargill,
Hutchison and Ito (1997).
2 There were 11 city banks, three long-term credit banks, and seven trust banks, a total
of 21 Big Banks. With the merger of Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi Bank and the
failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank the city banks were reduced to nine. The de facto
absorption of Nippon Trust Bank by Mitsubishi Bank means that the Big Banks as
of Summer 1998 are counted as 18 or 19.
3 For a description and analysis of the main bank system, particularly in the high
growth era, see Aoki and Patrick (1994).
4 The literature estimates of the evolving amounts of bad loans is substantial; see, for
example, Ohara (1996), Marsh and Paul (1996), and Waterhouse (1997–98).
5 See Waterhouse (1998a).
6 Stephen Vogel (1996) has well analysed the slow, near-haphazard process of MoF
policymaking.
7 See Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (1997), Hartcher (1997) and Wood (1992 )
8 See the careful, thorough, econometric analysis of McKibbin (1996).
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The problem
The non-performing loan problem has plagued the Japanese economy for several years, and
it is a major reason for the very slow growth of the Japanese economy (the average growth rate
being about one per cent per annum for the last seven years). Non-performing loans are largely
a result of the burst bubble (a sharp decline in real estate prices). Financial institutions that
had lent to real estate companies and developers became beset with loans that were not
repaid, or ended up seizing collateral whose market values were far below the book value.
The problem was complicated by the stock price decline, since Japanese banks
traditionally hold a large amount of securities. The accounting rule dictated (until March
1998) that bank balance sheets show the lower of the book value or the market value of
securities. The difference between the market and book values (which was considerable
during the bubble years of the late 1980s) was latent capital gain (fukumi), which was counted
as a part of bank tier II capital in the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) risk-based
capital standard. Banks had held securities for a long time, and stock prices had gone up
tremendously in the 1960s and 1970s.
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The problem was not addressed early or decisively. Minor financial crises had occurred
in the previous four years, however, government policy during this period has been reactive,
rather than proactive action aimed at preventing a crisis. Decisive action on the non-
performing loans problem is needed now to prevent a further shrinkage of Japanese financial
institutions and markets.
Mistakes dealing with the problem
A first wave of crises occurred in 1995, when the problem that Japan had created became so
apparent. Although small financial institutions had been merged with help of the Deposit
Insurance Corporation (DIC) since 1991, it was not until August 1995 that for the first time
a bank listed in the stock exchange was closed. The problem of housing-loan financial
institutions (jusen) was also dealt with in 1995, in favour of agricultural cooperatives which
had lent to jusen, and with a loss of credibility on the part of the bank regulators. Also in 1995
a trader in the New York branch of Daiwa Bank was found to have hidden a huge loss. The
delayed reporting of this to US regulators cost the bank an operating license in the United
States, and the credibility in bank supervision by the Ministry of Finance was further
damaged.
The yen appreciated to 80 yen per US dollar in April 1995, and affected export
industries. A pessimistic view on the economy prevailed. The stock price index declined below
the 15,000 mark. Banks’ fukumi declined and affected their balance sheets. Bank lending
declined, and further affected the real economy. The official discount rate was cut from 1.75
per cent at the beginning of the year to 0.5 per cent in June. A fiscal stimulus package was
also introduced.
With these ample signs of financial distress in 1995, policy responses were less than
adequate. First, the regulators believed that by solving the jusen problem with burdens on
banks, a major part of the non-performing loans problem had been solved. The monetary
authorities proclaimed that none of the 21 largest banks would be allowed to fail. However,
the authorities would not be able to maintain the ‘too-big-to-fail’ policy. Moreover, moral
hazard among bank executives became prevalent after the too-big-to-fail policy was an-
nounced. Second, by denying the seriousness of the problem, the authorities could not prepare
a scheme that would inject fiscal funds to solve the problem, or to inject enough funds to the
deposit insurance corporation. This made it impossible to act decisively, such as by closing
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down insolvent or near-insolvent banks and selling off assets with losses. Third, the monetary
authorities failed to enforce accurate accounting rules. Moreover, the authorities changed
accounting rules to hide non-performing loans.
These mistakes prolonged the non-performing loans problem, and finally erupted into
a full-blown crisis in November 1997.
Magnitude of the problem
At the end of September 1995, the volume of non-performing loans amounted to 10 per cent
of Japan’s GDP and 6 per cent of all the loans held by Japan’s depository institutions. It was
estimated that the total amount of non-performing loans made by Japanese banks amounted
to ¥27 trillion. These estimates might have been too low, however. Published estimates of non-
performing loans from private sources typically ranged between ¥50 trillion to ¥60 trillion,
or about twice the official estimate. These higher estimates of non-performing loans often
included loans overdue between 60 and 180 days (beyond 180 days they are counted in the
Ministry of Finance’s definition of non-performing loans), restructured above the official
discount rate (the official definition of non-performing loans counts only those that are
restructured with the interest rate below the ODR, and somehow estimated an amount of
cumulative loans toward interest payments (oigashi).
In November 1997, the government announced new criteria for non-performing loans,
and a new definition of the problem according to the new criteria. The first category in the new
criteria included normal, performing loans; the second category included performing loans
with some concerns for the future; the third and fourth categories corresponded to non-
performing loans. The sum of the second, third, and fourth categories amounted to 79 trillion
yen. From 1994 to 1997, banks used various resources to write off non-performing loans.
Japanese banks realised latent capital gains (fukumi) to write off non-performing loans, in
addition to using current profits. Banks also realised some of the gains from the falling stock
prices of the 1990s to help write off non-performing loan losses.
Japan’s banks, once regarded as among the most financially secure in the world, have
been continually downgraded by credit rating agencies. In August 1995 Moody’s Investor
Service released a new rating system for the major Japanese banks that did not incorporate
the government support they enjoyed. The new rating system was designed to rate banks on
a ‘stand alone’ basis, without government support, and is a ‘measure of the likelihood that a
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bank will require assistance from third parties such as its owners, its industry group, or
official institutions’. According to the new Moody’s rating system, no Japanese bank received
a rating of A (exceptional intrinsic financial strength) or B (intrinsic financial strength), and
the top 50 Japanese banks received an average rating of D (adequate financial strength
limited by a variety of factors). In January 1996, Moody’s cut its debt ratings of three Japanese
banks and that of the Yamaiachi Securities Company.
The problem of jusen companies
The jusen companies were created in the mid-1970s as subsidiaries of banks, securities firms,
and life insurance companies. The jusen companies initially expanded to provide consumer
credit. Much like consumer finance companies in the United States, they borrowed from other
institutions as they were not permitted to accept deposits. As the corporate sector reduced
its dependence on bank credit after 1975, however, banks began to turn to consumer finance,
and in the 1980s, they became aggressive lenders to individuals. In response to the aggressive
bank competition for individual loans, jusen companies turned to real estate lending in the
second half of the 1980s to substitute for the lost consumer lending business.
In April 1990 the Ministry of Finance introduced guidelines to banks to limit total
lending to the real estate sector; however, lending by jusen companies were exempted. During
1990 and 1991, jusen lending increased rapidly as a result of funds provided by agricultural
cooperatives and their prefecture federations. Concerns over the quality of assets held by
jusen companies were raised as early as 1992, and a 10-year rehabilitation plan was arranged
for the seven jusen companies in the Spring of 1993.
The problem of the jusen companies became the focus of an intense political debate in
1995 and even overshadowed the problem of banks’ non-performing loans. In August 1995,
the Ministry of Finance conducted a special examination of the jusen problem. Of the total ¥13
trillion of jusen assets, non-performing loans were estimated at ¥9.6 trillion, of which ¥6.4
trillion was considered unrecoverable and ¥1.2 trillion was considered a possible loss. This
is more than one-fourth of all losses incurred by financial institutions to date.
The Ministry of Finance and the suppliers of funds to jusen companies agreed to dissolve
the seven housing-loan companies, and in July 1996 the Jusen Resolution Corporation, now
known as the Housing Loan Administration Corporation, assumed the ¥6.4 trillion of
unrecoverable loans extended to failed jusen companies.
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The majority of the funding of jusen companies came from the 21 major banks and
agricultural credit cooperatives, each providing about the same levels of funding (¥5 trillion
for the 21 banks and ¥5.5 trillion for the cooperatives). Other funding sources were regional
banks (¥1.1 trillion), life insurance companies (¥0.8 trillion), and others (¥0.6 trillion).
Agricultural cooperatives’ being the largest supplier of funds posed a major policy issue. If the
potential loss of ¥7.6 trillion is divided in proportion to the outstanding loans to the jusen
companies, the agricultural cooperatives would have to write off more than ¥3 trillion in
losses. This was not possible, however, since these cooperatives operated with a small capital
base.
Politicians and Ministry of Finance officials suggested that banks should shoulder a
more than pro rata share of the jusen losses. The precedent for this approach had already been
set when banks were required to provide a more than pro rata share in schemes for dealing
with failing institutions in July and August 1995 (the Cosmo Credit Cooperatives, the Kizu
Credit Cooperatives and the Hyogo Bank). Banks not related to these institutions were asked
to contribute to the loss-sharing scheme by contributing capital or by making below-market-
rate loans to banks that assumed the assets of the insolvent institutions. The argument made
to justify these requests was based on the public-good characteristic of the financial system
and on the need to maintain stability, and to request responsibility beyond the legal
framework. The policy of requiring unrelated banks to contribute directly to bailout schemes
was referred to as the ‘all-Japan’ rescue scheme.
In December 1995, the government proposed a resolution plan for the seven insolvent
jusen companies. The plan has two shortcomings. First, the sharing of the burden was not
equitable. Rather, it reflected the political strength of the agricultural sector. The Banking
Bureau Director General of the Ministry of Finance had secretly signed a memorandum of
understanding with his counterpart at the Ministry of Agriculture during the debate over cost
sharing of the financial crisis. The heavier burden on banks also reflected the public
perception that ‘founder banks’ (banks that had set up jusen companies as subsidiaries) were
providing personnel to manage operations and were referring potential borrowers (who
turned out to be high-risk customers) to jusen companies. Second, the political opposition to
using tax funds was strong.
The perception of increased risk in Japan’s banks at large resulted in a ‘Japan premium’
in the Eurodollar market – a premium over the London interbank interest rate required of
Japan’s banks. The premium increased further when Daiwa Bank was discovered to have
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covered up derivative losses, amounting to at least US$1 billion, resulting from a ‘rogue’
trader in New York.
The jusen problem also reflects the problems of smaller institutions in Japan, such as
agricultural credit cooperatives. These are:
• Credit cooperative have diversified significantly away from their traditional speciali-
sation on loans to farmers related to agricultural operations;
• Some cred in July and August 1995it cooperatives have strong ties to the local
community and to local politicians;
• Credit cooperatives hold significant amounts of real estate related loans; and
• They are not regulated and supervised by the Ministry of Finance or by the Bank of
Japan, and local regulation and supervision is uneven in extent and sophistication.
Significant risk resides in these small institutions because of the substantial uncer-
tainty as to where they stand in Japan’s deposit-guarantee system.
Thus, by the end of 1995 the jusen problem, the problem of non-performing bank loans
and the risk exposure of large numbers of small financial institutions were seen as major and
unprecedented policy issues. The financial debacle in Japan is at least as great as the collapse
of the savings-and-loan industry and the related banking problems in the United States.
Regulatory response to the problem of non-performing loans
On 18 August, 1992, the government announced a temporary rule change that allowed
corporations to defer reporting stock-portfolio losses until the end of the fiscal year (March
1993), permitted other accounting innovations that delayed or concealed the impact of stock
price and land price declines on reported assets, allowed banks (in special cases where a loan
default would have adverse social effects) not to report interest concessions as taxable income,
directed the Postal Life Insurance System to support the stock market via funds provided to
trust banks, postponed sales of government-held shares of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
and Japan National Railways, used administrative guidance to encourage institutional
purchases of equities and discourage institutional sales of equities, and provided less-than-
candid estimates of the magnitude of the problem of non-performing loans.
The Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company (CCPC) was the first visible effort to deal
with the problem of non-performing loans. The CCPC now appears to have been set up
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primarily to provide accelerated tax benefits to the large banks without requiring the banks
to directly write off loses and acknowledge the losses in their public reports. Banks were
required to lend to the CCPC the amount equivalent to the value of assets, so if the assets were
finally sold to the market from the CCPC with losses, banks would still be held responsible
for the losses.
Banks’ response
Japan’s banks have been increasingly setting aside funds in special accounts to eventually
write off loses. Special provisioning by 21 banks increased from ¥1.9 trillion in March 1993
to ¥3.0 trillion in March 1994, and to ¥4.3 trillion in March 1995. Sumitomo Bank took a more
drastic step, charging losses of ¥826 billion to write off bad loans and showed losses in its
annual report for the period ending March 1995. But despite varying degrees of problems with
non-performing loans, Japan’s banks continue to pay dividends. Dividends per earnings
actually increased when the decline in earnings was taken into account.
The banks could pursue more aggressive remedies. More aggressive organisational
restructuring, such as selling assets and subsidiaries (branches or foreign operations) or
cutting personnel costs, could reduce operational costs.
Assisted mergers and the deposit insurance corporation
In 1991, the regulatory authorities, for the first time in the postwar period, officially assisted
mergers of insolvent depository institutions with stronger institutions, using the resources
of the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC), the larger of Japan’s two deposit-insurance
agencies. Since 1991, however, the DIC has publicly assisted a small number of problem
institutions, and the two more recently assisted institutions have exhausted the DIC’s
reserves. The details of the assisted mergers reveal a disturbing pattern about the ability of
Japan’s regulatory authorities to effectively administer deposit guarantees and limit ‘moral
hazard’:
 • Toyo Shinkin Bank in Osaka failed as a result of issuing fraudulent certificates of
deposits. In October 1992, the DIC provided a cash payment of ¥20 billion to Sanwa
Bank, a large city bank, to help it acquire Toyo Shinkin Bank. Shareholders of the
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failed institution retained ownership rights. One and a half shares of Toyo equity were
exchanged for one share of Sanwa equity.
• The failures of two credit cooperatives, Toyo Kyowa and Anzen, were handled by
establishing a new bank, Tokyo Kyodo Bank in March 1995. The new bank received an
infusion of capital from the Bank of Japan. This rescue plan was heavily criticized for
two reasons. The top management of the two failed institutions had engaged in
fraudulent behaviour by lending to themselves through their own real estate compa-
nies. The use of government funds to rescue an institution that had failed because of
fraud was questioned, even though management was purged and prosecuted.
• The Cosmo Credit Corporation collapsed in August 1995 in the wake of a classic run
on deposits, after which the Ministry of Finance moved to place restrictions on fund
withdrawals. Several weeks after the collapse of Cosmo, the Ministry of Finance
decided to close down Hyogo Bank and Kizu Credit, both experiencing deposit
withdrawals. In November 1996, the Ministry of Finance moved to liquidate Hanwa
Bank. The government made an explicit statement that the government would
guarantee all of Hanwa’s deposits. This reaffirmed a 1995 announcement that all
deposits at failed institutions would be guaranteed until the year 2000.
The banking crisis of November 1997
In November 1997, the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one of the 19 largest banks, and Yamaichi
Securities, one of the Big Four securities companies, failed. The immediate cause was that
these institutions could not get funding for overnight loans in the call market (interbank
market), because the market regarded these institutions as too risky to lend to. Although both
institutions were known to be weak, the failure was a surprise. The government had
announced in 1995 that the largest banks would survive, and all deposits would be safe.
Despite its promise, deposits to the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank continued to be withdrawn
in 1997.
The market interpreted the failures of the two large financial institutions as a sign that
the government had lost its grip on the financial market. The stock prices of other weak
financial institutions plummeted in Tokyo and the ‘Japan premium’ soared to 100 basis points
in the international market. It was feared that other collapses of financial institutions in
Tokyo would disrupt functions of the world financial markets.
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The government belatedly promised to strengthen the deposit insurance corporation by
issuing 30 trillion yen government bonds for protecting deposits from failed institutions and
for injecting capital to banks. The government belatedly realised that only fiscal authorities
can help the financial system.
The government also allowed banks to adopt an accounting method which could hide
unrealised capital losses from securities holdings. This was designed to clear the capital
adequacy requirement at the end of March 1998, as average stock prices slumped at around
16,000 yen. This was another cosmetic measure.
How to use 30 trillion yen effectively
A plan to appropriate 30 trillion yen was a response to the panic that followed the failure of
the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities. Of 30 trillion, 13 trillion was to be
used to inject capital to solvent, but thinly capitalised, banks, while 17 trillion was to be used
to protect depositors in insolvent, failing institutions. In March 1998 the first wave of capital
injection, amounting to less than 2 trillion yen, was carried out to 21 banks (18 large banks
plus 3 regional banks). However, due diligence, which was supposed to be a pre-condition, was
less than adequate. The inadequacy became apparent when the Long Term Credit Bank,
which received capital injection, became attacked in the market in June, and was forced to
seek a rescue merger.
Capital-adequacy requirements
One issue that complicated resolution of Japan’s banking problems concerned stock price
fluctuations and the application of capital-adequacy requirements. Japan’s banks commonly
hold stocks of their large corporate customers with which they have long-term cross-
shareholding relationships in the same enterprise groups. Since these stocks have typically
been held for some time, they contain unrealised capital gains that are not reported on balance
sheets. The latent capital gains (fukumi) have been a huge buffer in the capital position among
the Japanese banks that had been relatively undercapitalised.
In 1988, at the time of the adoption of the Basle capital-adequacy requirements, the
Japanese monetary authority negotiated successfully for latent capital gains to be counted as
a part of near-capital (Tier II capital). This was expected to make it easier for Japanese banks
to meet the Basle requirements and looked reasonable in 1988 and early 1989, before the
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bubble burst. As stock prices plummeted, banks suddenly faced a shortage of capital because
latent capital-gains fell significantly.
 Whenever the stock prices declined sharply, banks became squeezed. This stock-
market induced credit crunch happened in 1992, 1995 and 1997. Although the decline in stock
prices in 1992 was largely offset by issuing subordinated debts (retsugo sai), bank lending was
cut after 1995.
Deposit guarantees
Before the start of liberalisation in the mid 1970s, Japan’s deposit guarantees were supported
by an extensive set of constraints on portfolio decisions. From the 1950s to the early 1970s,
Japan’s financial system was one of the most regulated and administratively controlled in the
world. These controls limited the ability of financial institutions to assume and manage risk;
at the same time, they left the deposit-guarantee system untested.
Japan has relied upon administrative guidance by the Bank of Japan and the Ministry
of Finance to monitor institutions, impose regulatory discipline, intervene in financial
markets and force mergers. This is an activist approach in implementing deposit-guarantee,
and the degree to which Japanese regulatory authorities are willing to regulate financial
institutions is far greater than in most countries despite almost two decades of liberalisation.
Japanese financial regulation has historically been predicated on a ‘no-failure’ policy and has
not relied on a deposit-insurance framework that explicitly recognises the possibility of
failure. As a part of the ‘no-failure’ policy, deposit guarantees are interpreted broadly. It is
illustrative that Sumitomo Bank’s announcement in January 1995 that it expected to become
the first major Japanese bank to report an annual loss in the postwar period was regarded
as a major attitudinal change on the part of private banks and the Ministry of Finance.
Until recently, Japan’s deposit-guarantee system has not been tested for a variety of
reasons. Its macroeconomic environment has been conducive to a smooth and gradual
evolution toward open and competitive markets. Price stability generated only a small gap
between regulated and unregulated interest rates and thus provided few incentives to
innovate. The absence of open money markets limited the means to innovate; and regulation
and administrative guidance have been quite binding.
The major part of Japan’s deposit-guarantees is that offered by the Deposit Insurance
Corporation for banks and other deposit-taking financial institutions other than credit
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cooperatives, which protects up to 10 million yen per person per bank. However, an explicit
commitment by the government to protect all deposits until 2001 was added to calm the
market in 1995. It included another deposit insurance for specialised depository institutions,
mostly credit cooperatives and an explicit deposit-guarantee commitment to the Postal
Savings System.
The Deposit Insurance Corporation and the much smaller Savings Insurance Corpora-
tion have counterparts in many countries. However, the Postal Savings System – the largest
financial institution in the world – is a less understood financial intermediary. The system,
established in 1874, has come to play a major role in Japan’s public sector activities, especially
in the postwar period. It is regulated by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications,
placing the ministry among the three major financial agencies in Japan (after the Ministry
of Finance and the Bank of Japan). In 1992, the Postal Savings System even began to publicise
the fact that postal deposits were more secure than bank deposits.
The Postal Savings System has been a focal point of discussion during the past two
decades. Two issues seem particularly important in the context of the deterioration of the
financial system in the 1990s. First, a significant part of the flow of funds is likely to be
allocated on the basis of strong political connections rather than on the basis of economic
criteria. Postal savings funds are easily accessible to the Ministry of Finance to bail out
troubled financial institutions, especially the housing-loan companies. The Ministry of
Finance in 1992 even directed the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to use funds
from postal life insurance to support equity prices in the Tokyo stock exchange.
Second, the existence of the Postal Savings System in essence allows a dual system of
complete deposit guarantees and ensures that Japan will not easily be able to solve the conflict
between liberalisation on the one hand and deposit guarantees that encourage risk taking on
the other. The Postal Savings System thus stands at one end of the deposit-guarantee system.
At the other end are large city and regional banks that for all practical purposes are regarded
as too big to fail.
At some point Japan will need to deal explicitly with the Postal Savings System because
of its size and its potentially destabilising role in the deposit-guarantee system. Privatisation,
apparently the most efficient long-term solution, is bound to run into stiff political opposition.
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Lessons from the non-performing loans and jusen problems
In the context of growing public awareness of the non-performing loans and jusen problems,
as well as intense international pressure, in December 1995 the Japanese government
initiated a series of reforms. Six legislative bills were introduced and passed by the Diet.
Unfortunately, reform of the supervisary framework was omitted from this round of reforms.
Some observers question the effectiveness of any reform as long as the Ministry of Finance
–  whose indecision is primarily responsible for delayed response to the jusen problem –
remains the primary financial regulatory authority. Documents show that the Ministry of
Finance made the first on-site examinations of jusen companies in 1991–92 and found that
67 per cent of loans made to the largest 50 borrowers were already non-performing. Jusen
companies were, however, allowed to operate, because it was assumed that land prices would
rise in the near future. As land prices continued to decline, non-performing loans held by the
jusen companies increased by 75 per cent in the next four years.
Moral hazard
Moral hazard – incentives to assume more risk because deposit guarantees remove depositor
discipline as a constraint on risk taking by depository institutions – is a serious problem
despite a general unwillingness by Japanese regulatory authorities to recognize that fact. Two
credit cooperatives suffered from a classic case of moral hazard in their last two years.
Deposits at both institutions increased from ¥139 billion in March 1992 to ¥244 billion in
November 1994 (an annual rate of 32 per cent), while lending increased from ¥137 billion to
¥225 billion (an annual rate of 22 per cent). The majority of the new loans made during the
period were ultimately classified as non-performing. The total non-performing loans of the
two credit cooperatives increased from ¥250 billion (out of total loans of ¥1,371 billion) in
March 1992 to ¥1,769 billion (out of a total loan of ¥1,990 billion) in March 1994. Moreover,
unrecoverable losses increased from ¥65 billion in March 1992 to ¥1,118 billion in March 1994.
Not only did the two credit unions aggressively expand deposits to make new, higher-risk
loans during their decline into solvency, total non-performing loans increased sevenfold and
unrecoverable losses increased sixteenfold between March 1992 and March 1994. In addition,
rapid increases in deposits were made possible by offering above-market deposit rates.
2.17
No. 288 February 1999
Another moral hazard was apparent after 1995. Efforts by large banks to write off non-
performing loans were not enough. Dividends were still paid out, and management stayed.
No major consolidation and restructuring took place until the crisis of November 1997.
The big bang
The aftermath of asset inflation has revealed serious problems in Japan’s financial system
and structure of regulation. In many ways, Japan’s regulatory authorities appear to be
committing the same policy errors that US policymakers did several years earlier. Japan’s
deposit guarantee system remains bimodal, makes little effort to impose discipline on
depositors or shareholders, and relies on a passive regulatory attitude. The Japanese
government announced that a new regulatory regime would emerge by March 2001, when the
blanket guarantee for deposits will end. A new financial supervisory authority, spun off from
the Ministry of Finance, will be created.
The big bang policy, a comprehensive deregulation of financial markets, was announced
in November 1996. The first step was taken in April 1998 by deregulating the Foreign
Exchange Law and regulation. As a result, anyone can trade and transact foreign exchanges,
without being brokered by authorised banks. With deregulation, Japanese residents can open
accounts in foreign institutions abroad directly. With competition from abroad, financial
institutions (Japanese and foreign) in Japan also became aggressive in pursuing the ¥1200
trillion of household savings. Money management funds (MMF) and foreign bonds, which
offer higher yields than yen deposits, became popular. The exodus of saving is believed to be
partly responsible for the  yen depreciation after April 1998.
The current deterioration of the financial system may force the Bank of Japan to give
increasing consideration to prudential objectives in formulating policy – and those objectives
may conflict with domestic price stability. The newly created Financial Supervision Agency
has a difficult task in implementing a stringent standard, and forcing banks to take actions.
Concerns with prudential policy are always present. However, the willingness to directly
subsidise the banking sector on the basis of vague arguments of systemic risk has imposed
serious costs on the economy at large. With the failures of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and
Yamaichi Securities, no banks or securities firms feel safe under market pressure. Combined
with a new regime of financial supervision, the Japanese financial system is undergoing
significant changes.
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Without a strengthened supervisory regime, the big bang will result in a big failure.
Parallels with other countries
It has been shown that a currency crisis and a banking crisis occur simultaneously in a
mutually reinforcing manner. A country with a banking crisis often develops a currency crisis,
either by capital flight or being attacked by speculators. A currency devaluation often puts
banks with foreign-currency denominated liabilities into serious trouble. East Asian coun-
tries are no exception. Thailand had problems with the finance company industry (a form of
non-bank). Finance companies were identical to jusen in Japan, in terms of their funding,
investment and how they got into trouble. The Bangkok bubble (stock prices and real estates)
burst in 1995–96. By the end of 1996, several finance companies were beset with non-
performing loans problems, and short in liquidity. The Bank of Thailand supported them with
emergency loans through the deposit insurance fund. However, eventually 16 finance
companies were suspended in late June (just before the devaluation of 2 July 1997), and 42
more suspended in early August 1997 (just before the IMF support package). Those which lent
to finance companies were affected by their failures. This is also similar to the Japanese banks
that lent to jusen.
In Korea, banks were extending loans to chaebol group firms. As chaebols expanded into
industries which were not previously covered by their operations, banks were forced to lend
money to them. When the ‘diversification strategy’ failed, banks were left with non-
performing loans. Another route of problems was through merchant banks (non-banks). They
escaped banking regulation, appropriately stringent, and lent to real estate sectors.
In summary, the banking problem in Asia is either a trigger or a complicating factor of
the currency crisis. It is easy to say that over-development of the banking sector increased the
vulnerability to a crisis, and that the equity and bond markets were underdeveloped.
However, for developing countries, human capital in the financial sectors is limited, and it
is a difficult choice whether banking or securities industries should develop first. The Asian
experience poses this question.
In the case of Japan, it is more inexcusable. As the economy was integrated into a global
system, a better policy should have been devised earlier. On the one hand, regulation was too
much. Segmentation into banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, smaller financial
institutions, securities firms, life-insurance companies and non-life insurance companies
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should have been ended earlier. Basically, the ‘Big Bang’ should have taken place ten years
earlier. ‘Gradualism’ allowed rent-seeking financial institutions to make crucial mistakes
during the bubble years. On the other hand, there was too little regulation. Financial
deregulation should have been accompanied by strengthened supervision and a legal
framework. For example, Japan should have had a framework to fail banks. That is, the total
plan is ten years late with the benefit of hindsight, or at least five years late without the benefit
of hindsight.
Maybe, ‘Look East’ will have a new meaning – do not repeat the mistake of Japan.
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